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I. Introduction
President Lee Myung-bak won a landslide victory in 2007. His popularity before 
the election was obvious, and it came as a surprise to almost no one that he won 
by the largest margin since democratic elections fi rst began to be held in South 
Korea in 1987 (Onishi 2007). Many analysts agree that the struggling economy 
and other issues that many Koreans believed the Roh Moo-hyun government had 
not addressed very well were key in helping conservatives once again return to 
power. But another key issue was Lee’s strong stance on national defense and 
the relationship with what remains an unpredictable and belligerent neighbor to 
the north—the DPRK. Indeed, as distinguished North Korean analyst Nicholas 
Eberstadt (2007) stated following the election of 2007:
South Koreans winced as their government repeatedly abstained 
from U.N. votes criticizing North Korea for human rights 
abuses. They grumbled as they saw their tax-funded “economic 
cooperation” projects with the North devolve into an economic 
lifeline for a still-hostile government in Pyongyang. And they 
worried as the undisguised rift with Washington over “the North 
Korean threat” created unmistakable strains in the vital U.S.-South 
Korean alliance.
Lee’s presidency shows a shift to the center-right in the ROK electorate (Steinberg 
2008).
Since Lee Myung-bak assumed the presidency of South Korea, he has 
encountered many challenges. Indeed, Lee has been accused by many on the 
left for being too hard on North Korea and for bringing diffi culties back into 
the North-South relationship (though in reality this was almost entirely a one-
way relationship during Roh’s administration when it came to compromise 
and transparency—almost exclusively on the part of South Korea).1 But these 
criticisms have not gained nearly as much attention as those mounted against 
Lee for his desire to move forward on the free trade agreement with the United 
States, which will give U.S. beef imports what some critics (unfairly in my view) 
have called unsafe inroads into the South Korean food market. Indeed, the beef 
issue (to the surprise of many Americans) became a prominent issue in South 
Korea and led to candlelight vigils, protests in the street, and what amounted to 
a legitimate crisis for the Lee Myung-bak government (Junn 2008).
1. For examples of criticism of Lee’s North Korea policies from left-of-center analysts and 
politicians, see Toloraya (2008) and Shim (2008).
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Although the beef issue may have been an emotional one for many Koreans, it 
seems there was more to it than meets the eye. Indeed, many analysts have said 
this was in reality a move by the left designed to subvert the new government of 
Lee Myung-bak. As Victor Cha (2008), a professor at Georgetown University, 
recently wrote:
While the trigger for Korea’s self-paralyzing demonstrations were 
concerns about beef, it is increasingly apparent that the ideological 
Left in Korea, pushed out of power after over one decade in the seat 
of the presidency and in control of the National Legislature—and 
with no major election scheduled for another four years—have 
taken their politics to the streets in an effort to subvert the fi rst 
conservative government Korean government in a decade.
Cha further cut to the crux of the matter when he wrote, “This is not about lofty 
notions of a new Korean nationalism, but about the primitive struggle for political 
power long a part of politics on the peninsula.” According to press reports (Kang 
I. 2008), several civic groups and left-of-center activists actually planned many 
of the rallies with the specifi c intent of bringing down Lee’s government.
While the beef issue has been the center of most of the attention in South Korea 
in recent months, in my view it took away from other important issues that must 
be addressed. As this issue has begun to die down, the very real challenges and 
issues that face Lee’s government and the ROK-U.S. alliance can now become 
the center of more focus by policymakers and analysts in the United States and 
South Korea. Perhaps most important, Lee has now stated that his policy toward 
North Korea is to seek eventual unifi cation under a liberal democracy. This is a 
signifi cant break from the policy of his predecessors in the Kim Dae-jung and 
Roh Moo-hyun administrations who sought “peaceful coexistence” with North 
Korea but paid little attention to what would be an expensive and problematic 
post-unifi cation situation (Kim S. 2008).
This new policy points to the important issues that will be addressed in this 
paper. For South Korea to be able to work toward unifi cation under a liberal, 
democratic government, the government in Seoul must be able to develop its 
military capabilities in order to match the continuing North Korean threat posed 
by its conventional and unconventional forces. South Korea has a diffi cult task. 
The government (along with its key military ally, the United States) must plan 
for a force-on-force confl ict with North Korea and maintain capabilities that 
effectively deter the DPRK; at the same time, South Korean government offi cials 
must prepare for a possible collapse of the threat that they are deterring and plan 
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for the huge challenges that will exist if either one of these scenarios occurs. 
To do so, South Korea must be able to actually either pay for the additional 
capabilities needed or ensure that a strong alliance exists with the United States, 
which can supplement the gaps until fi scal or military readiness challenges, or 
both, are met.
This leads to the question of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the 
scheduled dismantlement of Combined Forces Command (CFC) in 2012. Can 
it be done? Finally, several other issues need to be addressed in the near term as 
South Korea looks at its military alliance with the United States. Not the least 
of these issues is the cost of maintaining U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula 
(and cost sharing) and the upcoming move of U.S. troops out of Seoul and bases 
in the Uijongbu-Tongducheon corridor. I will address all of these issues in this 
paper and make some suggestions for planning and policy that will be important 
as the ROK-U.S. military alliance continues to evolve and improve to meet the 
challenges for security and stability on the Korean peninsula in coming years.
II. ROK Military Development:                                                             
Matching Capabilities to the Threat
Many issues face the alliance between the United States and South Korea, but 
there is no doubt that the bulwark of the relationship between these two nations is 
the ROK-U.S. military alliance. This is the alliance that has protected the stability 
and security of the Korean peninsula since the end of the Korean War.
The military alliance has undergone several important changes in recent years. 
Not the least of these is the “transformation” of ROK military forces, with an 
original end date of 2020, that was estimated to cost 164 trillion won. The plan, 
set into place under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, also is supposed to give 
the ROK military the independent capability to operate under separate wartime 
command from U.S. forces by 2012 (Jin 2007). Evidence that the process of 
transitioning to two separate wartime commands is going forward can be seen 
if one examines the recent Ulchi Focus Guardian exercise held during August of 
2008. During that exercise, the South Koreans and Americans simulated fi ghting 
a war under two separate operational commands, one led by the chairman of 
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff and one led by the commander of United 
States Korea Command (KORCOM—eventual successor to United States Forces 
Korea [USFK]). The exercise was observed by several retired military offi cers 
from both the United States and South Korea and is expected to aid in planning 
for the major changes that are expected to occur by 2012 (Jung S. 2008e).
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There has been a great deal of criticism regarding the transformation plan set into 
action by the Roh administration. Not only will this expensive transformation 
process put a huge strain on the budget of South Korea’s government, but also 
much of the planning put into this transformation process can legitimately be 
called very dangerous to the security of South Korea. The transformation plan 
has several key weakness: (1) it calls for cutting military forces by 180,000 
before acquisition of modern programs can offset the reduction in forces, (2) 
the plan was not set up to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, 
which have proven to be signifi cant since the events of 2006, and (3) the plan 
did not include enough programs, or programs that are robust enough in nature, 
or the proper security measures to meet the requirements of Seoul’s planned 
takeover of separate wartime OPCON from the U.S. military in 2012. Press 
reports are already saying that the ROK government may push the plan back 
from its planned date of 2020 to 2025 because of the reasons stated above and 
because of budgetary issues (Jung S. 2008h).
As the South Korean military continues its transformation process and pushes 
on with the challenges it faces in the changing ROK-U.S. military alliance, 
policymakers in Seoul cannot forget that the North Korean threat remains 
ominous and very real. North Korea continues to maintain the world’s fi fth-
largest military—a military that is equipped with a nuclear capability, ballistic 
missiles, and an asymmetric capability that has evolved since the mid-1990s.2 
Pyongyang has yet to even discuss terms for eliminating its estimated 6 to 12 
nuclear weapons, and it continues to deploy 70 percent of its ground forces within 
90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). These forces include two deployed 
mechanized corps, an armor corps, and an artillery corps—plus a missile corps 
that has more than 600 Scuds and 200 No-dong missiles capable of striking 
anywhere in South Korea or Japan (Klingner 2008a). For the Lee administration 
to make up for the mistakes made by the Roh administration’s transformation 
program, it will need to focus on two key areas: (1) the North Korean threat, 
based on the simple intelligence doctrine (Applegate 2001) that a threat is defi ned 
as capability + intent = threat, and (2) a renewed focus on interoperability with 
U.S. forces as ROK independent capability comes to fruition. The second key 
area was ignored for most of the Roh administration and will be important as the 
ROK and U.S. militaries make an effort to continue deterring the North Korean 
threat during the transitions occurring in the ROK-U.S. military alliance.
The North Korean military threat has most certainly evolved. Indeed, a drastic 
shortage of fuel (because of a lack of subsidies from the Soviet Union beginning 
2. For current analysis on the North Korean military threat, see Scobell and Sanford (2007).
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in 1990) and sometimes food has forced a dip since the mid-1990s in the fi eld 
training levels of its conventional forces, as seen in its traditional infantry, 
mechanized, armor, and artillery units.3 Despite these very real setbacks, the 
DPRK has adjusted quite cleverly. In fact, since the mid-1990s, North Korea 
has signifi cantly increased the capabilities of its missile forces in sophistication, 
numbers (large increases in the numbers of all types of missiles), and command 
and control. The North Korean Army has integrated missiles into its artillery 
doctrine, and in any force-on-force confl ict (or limited confl ict, for that matter) 
missiles would be used as “long-range artillery systems,” able to target any node 
in South Korea and many in Japan.4
But missiles are only the beginning. Since the late 1990s the North Koreans have 
signifi cantly increased the number of long-range artillery systems (the systems 
referred to as long-range are the 170mm self-propelled artillery system and the 
240mm multiple rocket launcher system) deployed along the DMZ—close to 
900 hundred of these systems are located within a short distance of the DMZ 
and up to 300 of these systems can target areas in and around Seoul.5 The long-
range artillery that can hit Seoul and other areas of Kyonggi province are also 
a threat because some or all of these systems are likely to be equipped with 
chemical munitions—this is in addition to the fact that their forward deployed 
positions would permit these systems to strike Seoul with little or no warning 
(Herskovitz 2006). U.S. Department of Defense offi cials have estimated that 
in a North Korean attack on the ROK up to 250,000 people would die in Seoul 
from the artillery attack alone (Geramone 2006). The fi nal member of the “triad” 
that is the asymmetric threat North Korea poses to the ROK is the large, well-
equipped, and highly trained cadre of North Korean Special Operations Forces. 
These forces number up to 100,000 and are capable of attacking key nodes within 
South Korea (including U.S. bases), disrupting command and control, and even 
carrying out acts of terrorism and assassination.6
3. For analysis on the impact lack of readily available fuel has had on North Korean conventional 
military forces training trends, see Von Hippel (2006).
4. For analysis on how North Korea has increased its capabilities in command and control of missile 
forces by forming a missile corps, see Bermudez (2005).
5. For an excellent analysis of increases in numbers of long-range systems deployed along the 
DMZ beginning in the late 1990s, see the testimony of General Thomas A. Schwartz (2000), 
commander USFK; for specifi c estimates on the number of long-range artillery systems North 
Korea has forward deployed on or near the DMZ, see Bermudez (2003); for information regarding 
the number of long-range artillery systems along the DMZ that can specifi cally target Seoul, see 
Macintyre (2003).
6. For more on strategy, tactics, and capabilities of North Korean Special Operations Forces, see 
Kaplan (2006) and GS (1996).
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During the Roh administration the ROK government refused to acquire 
antimissile systems capable of defending the ROK from the more than 600 Scud 
missiles in the North that target nodes all over South Korea. To exacerbate the 
situation, North Korea has now built, tested, and deployed an advanced version 
of the old Soviet SS-21 (known as the KN-02).7 This is one of the key examples 
where the transformation of the ROK military as directed by the Blue House 
during the Roh administration in essence failed to take into account the very 
threat that it was supposed to be built to deter and defend against. During the Roh 
administration, South Korea agreed to purchase 48 secondhand PAC-2 Patriot 
systems from Germany—systems that will be sadly lacking in their ability to 
shoot down Scuds, according to the Korea Herald on 30 May 2007. According 
to sources in the South Korean press (Jung S. 2008f), these systems are now 
being deployed to some locations in the ROK. In my view it should be stressed 
that the PAC-2 system will be highly ineffective in either providing deterrence 
against a Scud missile attack or in actually being capable of shooting down the 
missile. During the Roh administration, high-level U.S. offi cials repeatedly 
advised the South Korean government of just this fact.
During the current Lee administration, the South Koreans have taken important 
steps to remedy their land-based ballistic missile defense, but these are only 
preliminary steps. Defense Industry Daily reported on 4 March 2008 that the South 
Korean government has now begun preliminary efforts to buy up to 48 PAC-3 
fi re systems (the PAC-3 system is widely considered to be much more effective 
than its PAC-2 predecessor in bringing down Scud and No-dong missiles), at 
least some of which will be deployed by 2012. In addition, Hankyoreh Ilbo on 8 
July 2008 reported that the South Koreans are considering purchase of X-band 
radar, an essential element of missile defense and a system that uses advanced 
technology. These are both important initial steps that the ROK government 
needs to take in order to deter and defend against missile attacks from North 
Korea. But these are only initial steps. As it stands right now the only missile 
defense systems on the peninsula that are truly capable of defending against a 
missile attack are the PAC-3 Patriot systems currently manned, maintained, and 
operated by the U.S. Army. Chosun Ilbo reported on 24 August 2006 that 64 of 
these systems were currently deployed in South Korea.
The Japanese model serves as an excellent example of what South Koreans can 
expect if they build a missile defense system that forms a realistic deterrent and 
defense against possible North Korean attack. The Japanese Navy successfully 
7.  For more on the numbers and capabilities of North Korean Scud and KN-02 missiles, see Jung 
S. (2007a).
17149_075-100.indd   81 3/16/2009   4:09:42 PM
82 U.S.–Korea Academic Symposium
conducted its fi rst test of the SM-3 (ship deployed) interceptor missile in 
December 2007. The Japanese are building a two-tier missile defense system 
in close cooperation with the United States. The SM-3 will be launched from 
Aegis-class ships to intercept missiles at high altitudes, and the PAC-3 systems 
(deployed on land bases) will intercept missiles at lower altitudes, reported 
Chosun Ilbo on 19 December 2007. Japan plans to deploy 36 SM-3 missiles 
between 2007 and 2010 on four Aegis-class ships and also plans to deploy 124 
advanced-capability PAC-3 interceptor missiles by 2010 on several bases and 
key locations throughout their country. Finally, Japan has already deployed 
X-band radar (Claremont Institute 2008). Thus far, according to Chosun Ilbo on 
21 December 2007, the South Korean government has made no plans to purchase 
the SM-3 system (the preliminary purchase plans for PAC-3 missile systems 
are for many fewer systems than Japan’s although the threat from North Korean 
missiles is higher) for their own Aegis-class ships (known as the King Sejong–
class destroyers) and has not agreed to join the U.S. missile defense system—a 
carryover from the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations.
Japan and the United States currently man what is known as the bilateral joint 
operations center to coordinate and share missile defense information in a 
timely manner. During the North Korean missile fi rings of July 2006, the United 
States and Japan exchanged information in a timely manner through an interim 
coordination facility located at Yokota Air Base (DOS 2007; Little 2007). 
Indeed, Bush administration offi cials commented that having the missile defense 
system (land borne and sea borne) ready in and around Japan during 2006 was 
a signifi cant factor in allowing the president to decide not to destroy the Taepo-
dong 2 missile before it could be launched; thus, escalation of what was already 
becoming a regional crisis was avoided. John Rood, acting under secretary of 
state for arms control and international security, remarked on 11 March 2008: 
“We didn’t have to seriously consider options like preemption or overwhelming 
retaliation. We had a defense, and we were content to use that defense, and it 
was a way of not contributing to the crisis being larger” (Boese 2008).
The reason behind Seoul’s failure to purchase a modern missile defense system 
with the capabilities necessary to truly deter the North Korean threat is most 
certainly not a lack of encouragement from the United States. In fact, during 
the Roh administration General B. B. Bell (2007a), then the commander of 
USFK, stated, “The Republic of Korea must purchase and fi eld its own TMD 
system, capable of full integration with the U.S. system. The regional missile 
threat from North Korea requires an active ROK missile defense capability 
to protect its critical command capabilities and personnel.” This assessment 
continues to be the view of the current commander of USFK, General Walter 
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Sharp, who stated in congressional testimony that South Korea should build 
a “layered” missile defense system (probably a reference to the same type of 
system that is currently being built and deployed by Japan) and should look to 
being interoperable with the U.S. global missile defense shield (also a possible 
reference to the arrangement between U.S. and Japanese missile defense forces). 
General Sharp also stated, “in the short term, South Korea must develop a 
systematic missile defense solution to protect its critical civilian and military 
command capabilities, critical infrastructure and population centers” (Jung S. 
2008d). During Lee’s successful campaign for president, the Korea Herald in 
a special edition in December 2007 reported that Lee stated that, if elected, his 
government might reconsider the Roh government’s stance on missile defense. 
If South Korea is to be capable of defending itself against a missile attack from 
the North, signifi cant steps must be taken to initiate this policy.
Missiles are not the only North Korean threat against the South that has 
evolved since the mid-1990s. The biggest is one that was largely ignored or 
at best underrated during the Roh administration: the necessity to acquire an 
independent, modern, robust, C4I system (command, control, communication, 
computers, and intelligence)—a system capable of being fully integrated with 
U.S. systems and interoperable servicewide (joint) within the ROK military. 
This is critical now as the United States has nearly completed the transitioning 
of 10 major security operations from USFK to the South Korean military. The 
10th and last mission (search-and-rescue operations with the U.S. Air Force 
that will now be conducted with ROK forces in the lead role) is scheduled to 
be transitioned in the fall of 2008 (Jung S. 2008b). Of key importance here is 
the fact that in 2005 the ground-based mission of providing counterfi re against 
North Korean artillery (including the long-range systems) was handed over to 
the South Korean Army. Up until that time the mission had been handled by 
the Second U.S. Infantry Division, which was equipped with 30 multiple rocket 
launcher systems and 30 M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers (Kim and 
Lee 2005).
The relationship of C4I to this artillery mission is quite simply a matter of life 
or death. Integration of these systems into a modern C4I system means that 
when they are operating in counterbattery mode they will have a quick reaction 
time and also the ability to identify the location of North Korean artillery units 
with radar and take them out just as the enemy systems have been fi red or are 
about to be fi red. A lack of this capability means the South Korean systems that 
replaced the U.S. systems are simply guns that cannot react rapidly enough to 
target North Korean systems in a timely manner and thus protect allied forces, 
Seoul, and the seat of government (Yun 2005). This becomes even more a matter 
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of concern if one addresses the issue of integrating counterbattery fi re with allied 
airpower. Without a modern C4I system (as Korea’s U.S. allies have) this is 
next to impossible and, in fact, severely degrades the South Korean capability 
to target North Korean systems and quickly destroy them.
To be sure, Lee Myung-bak pledged during his campaign to turn the South 
Korean military into an effi cient, high-tech force by establishing a network-
centric capability. There are already signs that this is beginning to happen. During 
August it was announced that the United States and South Korea had reached 
an agreement on the ROK military acquiring the Global Hawk unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV). The Global Hawk system is an advanced, long-range, long-dwell-
time aircraft, and it can transmit its data via satellite to forces on the ground.8 
There have been other efforts to upgrade C4I for ROK forces, but they thus 
far have proven to be too little, too late. One example of this is the Koreasat 5 
(also called the Mugunghwa 5), which serves as a combined civil and military 
communications satellite, according to Donga Ilbo on 23 August 2006. Although 
this is certainly a step in the right direction, thus far this system has proven to 
be purely experimental, not integrated into a national information architecture 
where the military is thoroughly integrated with the national command authority 
(such a system and integration do not exist), and unlikely to meet even the basic 
needs of either an independent or integrated C4I system.
To put a fi ner point on it, the South Korean military (and its decision makers in 
government) continues to depend on the United States for almost all strategic 
information. In fact, at least for now, ROK forces are also heavily dependent 
on U.S. systems for much of their tactical battlefi eld information.9 South Korea 
holds a signifi cant edge in integrating, interpreting, processing, and utilizing 
battlefi eld information (such as the movement of forces, activities of missile 
units, and mechanized forces) over North Korea—especially on forces that are 
not near the DMZ—only because of the many high-tech C4I systems that the 
United States currently staffs, maintains, and deploys to the Korean peninsula 
(or off-peninsula) as part of its obligations in the ROK-U.S. military alliance 
(Kim M. 2008).
8. Reported by Chosun Ilbo on 11 August 2008, http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/
news/200808/200808110007.html, and by StrategyPage.com on 12 August 2008, www.strategypage.
com/htmw/htintel/articles/20080812.aspx.
9. For details of specifi c U.S. systems that South Korea depends on to provide both strategic and 
tactical battlefi eld and potential battlefi eld information and the current gaps in South Korea’s military 
information systems, see Yun (2006).
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For the third element of the North Korean asymmetric threat—Special 
Operations Forces (SOF)—the role of C4I is important for South Korea’s 
military in defending against North Korean SOF and in working together with 
U.S. allies in order to respond or deploy in any force-on-force confl ict. The 
former commander of Special Operations Command Korea, Brigadier General 
Simeon Trombitas (2007), supports this assessment: “Constructing a bilateral 
C4I sharing capability with a common architecture is critical for interaction with 
our ROK counterparts to increase the synergy between our forces and enhance 
command and control.”
Another important factor must be addressed if one is to discuss South Korea’s 
current capability to counter the North Korean SOF threat. This is the airlift 
of South Korea’s own elite special forces and airborne brigades. South Korea 
currently has seven special forces brigades (all airborne) in its army and fi ve 
independent brigades (two infantry and three counterinfi ltration). Other smaller 
units also would require airlift in any confl ict or contingency. These are among the 
ROK’s most elite forces, and they are among the best trained in the world—but 
without airlift they cannot get to where they need to go to conduct their vital 
missions. The South Korean Air Force transport fl eet is currently lacking in its 
capability to conduct this mission. There are only 10 C-130Hs in the ROKAF 
inventory and 15 smaller, Spanish-designed, twin-engined CN-235Ms (So 
2002). Thus, as it stands right now, a major source of airlift for the ROK special 
forces and other airborne units (because of capabilities lacking in the ROKAF) 
is the U.S. Air Force. These two issues (C4I and airlift) must be addressed 
and compensated for in order for the South Korean military to truly be able to 
counter the North Korean SOF threat in an independent way. Thus, as the Lee 
administration looks to the future, these are important acquisition and integration 
issues that will have to be addressed.
I have addressed only three key threats from North Korea—a triad of asymmetric 
threats if you will. North Korea has been able to successfully integrate these 
capabilities into its military forces as resource constraints have limited the 
training and ultimately some of the readiness of its more conventional traditional 
ground forces. But one must keep in mind that during a full-scale force-on-
force confl ict these asymmetric forces would likely be able to create gaps and 
vulnerabilities in ROK and U.S. military forces defending South Korea that 
would then enable less-capable—but still deadly—DPRK forces to move into 
these gaps and attack key nodes, causing signifi cant damage in the essential 
early hours and days of any war. This is an important aspect of analyzing the 
threat that must be (and likely is) included in any planning for confl ict on the 
Korean peninsula. One has only to look at the unique landmass of the Korean 
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peninsula along the DMZ to realize the narrow invasion corridors into South 
Korea provide opportunities that can be exploited (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Korean Invasion Routes
Source: North Korean Country Handbook, U.S. Department of Defense, May, 1997, URL:
http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Foia/nkor.pdf 
Other issues of the current ROK transformation are important as well as South 
Korea deals with challenges related to development and integration with U.S. 
forces. One that I would like to discuss here is the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI)—an issue that is likely to be a source of continuing debate as the Lee 
administration looks to its immediate national defense and its alliance with 
the United States. The reason this is so important is because of the threat that 
North Korea poses to regions outside of Northeast Asia through its proliferation 
of a variety of weapons systems, particularly missiles. Pyongyang has shown 
a singular profi ciency in its ability to proliferate missiles, missile components, 
and missile technology to nations in both the Middle East and South Asia. The 
result is a serious threat to the status quo in these regions and often a ratcheting 
up of tensions.
One has only to look to the recent example of Iran to understand why PSI is so 
important. North Korea sold 18 Taepo-dong X (also known as the Musudan) 
ballistic missile systems (a system based on the old Soviet SS-N-6 design) to 
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Iran in 2005 (Ben-David 2005). According to press reports, Iran successfully 
conducted a test-launch of this system during 2006. The missile is reported to 
have a range of up to 4,000 kilometers (Vick 2006; Rubin 2006). As shown in 
Figure 2, Iran now has the capability thanks to missile systems acquired from 
North Korea (all of the systems on the map were acquired from North Korea) 
to threaten not only Israel or other nations in its own region but NATO forces 
in Europe as well (HPSCI 2006).
Figure 2: Ranges of Iran’s Missiles
Source: Andrew Feickert, “Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries,” 
Report no. RL30427 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 26 July 2005).
South Korea during the Roh administration refused to participate actively in PSI, 
and most agree that the key reason was likely a reluctance to join in activities 
that would hurt reconciliation efforts with North Korea.10 According to a special 
edition of the Korea Herald that came out in December 2007, before Lee Myung-
bak assumed the leadership of South Korea, aides were stating at the time that 
10. For more analysis on South Korea’s role in the PSI, see Kim Myung-jin (2006).
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Lee might reconsider South Korea’s stance on PSI and take a more active role in 
it—particularly if North Korean nuclear provocations were to intensify. Given 
the current state of affairs with the six-party talks and North Korea’s continuing 
proliferation to other rogue states such as Syria, one hopes that this will happen 
(J. Kim 2008; Harden 2008; DNI 2008; Henry 2008). This would in my view 
be a welcome decision in Washington.
In fact, the United States has renewed calls for South Korea to take an active 
role in the PSI. At a media roundtable reported by Chosun Ilbo on 29 May 2008, 
John Rood, acting under secretary of state for arms control and international 
security, stated, “We would certainly encourage them [South Korea] to join, and 
we’ve engaged in a number of discussions with them.” Rood also stated, “The 
present government in Seoul is, I think, reviewing the issue. We will await the 
outcome of that.” Indeed, one of the key ways that Seoul can contribute to and 
strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance would be to take a more active role in the 
PSI. Such a move would also likely serve to hamper Pyongyang’s proliferation 
to dangerous regions of the world.
III. Can the ROK Government Pay for Needed Capabilities?
If South Korea truly is to be capable of self-reliant national defense in coming 
years, it must initiate the programs and policies—among others—addressed 
earlier in this paper. The diffi culty is that this will be an expensive effort and 
one that is likely to put a severe strain on an economy in South Korea that is 
already experiencing diffi culties.
President Lee recently addressed two global issues that are having a profound 
effect on the South Korean economy—soaring oil prices and global crop 
shortages. While on a visit to the city of Pusan during July of this year, Lee 
stated, “The economy is heavily dependent on exports. Therefore, these factors 
make it challenging for the government to fi nd the right solutions. But we are 
people who tend to become strong and united when times are extremely tough” 
(Kang H. 2008). The effects of rising prices for fuel and food have already had 
an impact on the South Korean military. In fact, according to press reports, in 
July of 2008 the South Korean military was forced to reduce exercises to save 
energy. Flight training hours for pilots are to be reduced, with some of the training 
being made up on simulators; the army has made plans to reduce by 30 percent 
its fi eld training exercises using tactical vehicles, and the navy will reduce 27 
percent of its training—to include slowing down the speed of its vessels training 
at sea (Jung S. 2008c).
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There is also likely to be a direct impact on another important issue for South 
Korea’s military forces—Defense Reform 2020, Seoul’s transformation plan to 
upgrade and modernize its forces to prepare for independent national defense 
capabilities. According to recent press reports, the transformation plan, set to be 
fi nished by 2020, may end up undergoing extensive revision. The primary reason 
for the drastic overhaul of the reform package is budget shortfalls, according 
to many military experts and defense offi cials in South Korea. Some experts 
have predicted a further decrease in defense expenditures for the plan. One of 
the fi rst programs that might be axed as a result of these budget shortfalls is the 
Global Hawk UAV program. The South Korean government might quite simply 
be unable to afford the world’s most sophisticated high-altitude UAV.
The budgetary problems inherent in Seoul’s current military transformation 
plan could have other ramifi cations. First, transformation might end up getting 
pushed back to a fi nish date of 2025. Second, the current schedule for systems 
acquisition and troop cuts is assessed by many experts to be inadequate to 
account for North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities. And third (and perhaps 
most important), many military experts also assess that the defense reform did 
not include required arms procurement plans and security measures for Seoul’s 
transition to independent wartime OPCON of its forces, scheduled to occur in 
2012 (Jung S. 2008a).
To exacerbate issues related to wartime OPCON and the transition of ROK and 
U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula in coming years, the planned cost of the 
U.S. base relocation of U.S. forces from bases near the DMZ and in Seoul to a 
“hub” at Camp Humphreys (subsidized by the ROK government and including 
the Land Partnership Program, a trade of U.S. bases in the western corridor 
for land expansion at Humphreys) is being projected to increase, according to 
South Korean Ministry of National Defense sources (Jung S. 2008j). These are 
important issues related to the transformation of ROK forces, and the issues 
of defense reform and base relocation will have an impact on the planned 
disestablishment of CFC and the establishment of two separate wartime 
operational commands.
Burden Sharing
Burden sharing has been a major source of contention during the past two 
years—starting under the Roh Moo-hyun administration and now continuing 
under the Lee Myung-bak administration. The most important aspect is the issue 
of non-personnel stationing costs (NPSC) for U.S. troops stationed in South 
Korea. In 2007 Seoul’s contribution to the Special Measures Agreement (which 
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covers these costs) represented only 41 percent of the NPSC. During 2007, the 
commander of USFK, General B. B. Bell (2007a), stated that this percentage 
falls far short of an even cost-sharing agreement between allies, which would 
include a 50 percent NPSC contribution from both allies. These costs are usually 
used to pay for important alliance maintenance relating to the stationing of U.S. 
troops in Korea; they include labor costs for South Korean employees of USFK, 
the purchase of logistics and supplies, and the construction of military facilities. 
The failure of Seoul to make what many consider to be a fair contribution to 
these costs (in an era when U.S. forces are already dangerously stretched all over 
the world) could lead to dangerous cuts in force and military base maintenance 
(Lee 2007).
During July 2008, offi cials from the U.S. Department of Defense and the ROK 
Ministry of National Defense met in Washington and held talks (called the 
Security Policy Initiative) to discuss a variety of issues, including burden sharing. 
But at the end of the talks South Korean and U.S. offi cials were unable to narrow 
differences over how to share joint defense costs related to the maintenance 
of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula. During the talks U.S. offi cials again 
called on South Korea to increase funding for NPSC, bringing South Korea in 
line with Seoul’s growing economy and increased responsibility for national 
defense. Offi cials from Seoul responded that their government wanted to provide 
military equipment and materials to the U.S. military instead of offering host-
nation funds in cash (Jung S. 2008k).
As offi cials from the United States and South Korea prepared to meet and hold 
talks on cost-sharing issues in August 2008, the issue of 50-50 cost sharing for 
NPSC continued to remain a contentious issue. The meeting in August 2008 
did not produce results that were equitable to both allies. Washington asked 
Seoul to pay 6.6 to 14.5 percent more during 2009, but South Korean offi cials 
countered that they were looking at a possible raise of a maximum of 2.5 percent, 
equal to the previous year’s domestic infl ation rate. Washington also asked 
Seoul to increase its portion of the cost to 50 percent on a long-term basis, but 
South Korean offi cials countered with setting Seoul’s share at an “adequate 
and reasonable” level and to change the cost-sharing method from paying one 
lump sum to sending materials on a case-by-case basis (once again referring 
back to part of Seoul’s offer during July 2008). Talks will continue, but the issue 
remains one that has been diffi cult for the two allies to reach agreement on. 
South Korea’s share during 2008 accounted for 741.5 billion won.11 If increased 
by 6.6 percent, this would be 790.4 billion won, and a 14.5 percent hike would 
be 849 billion won.
11. $1.00 = 1,082 won.
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I earlier compared South Korea’s policy and acquisition of missile defense 
systems with that of Japan’s. I believe it is also useful to refer to the Japanese 
model when it comes to the issue of burden sharing. If one is to look at NPSC 
costs, the percentage of what Japan pays is signifi cantly higher compared with 
South Korea’s payments (Chanlett-Avery, Manyin, and Cooper 2006). Indeed, as 
the Japan-U.S. military alliance continues to transition, more than 8,000 of the 
18,000 Marines currently in Okinawa will move to Guam. Tokyo has agreed to 
pay a signifi cant portion of these costs (Halloran 2007). The Marines are expected 
to relocate by 2014, and, of the estimated $10.27 billion cost for facilities and 
infrastructure development for the III Marine Expeditionary Force, Japan will 
pay $6.09 billion (DOS 2006).
Base Relocation
Another important issue that certainly has fi scal implications for the United States 
and South Korea is that of base relocation. During the Roh administration the 
time line for consolidation of U.S. Army forces from several small bases and 
such large compounds as Yongsan (in Seoul) and Camp Casey to one hub at 
Camp Humphreys (near Pyongtaek) was pushed back to 2012 (Jung S. 2007b). 
But the relocation has run into numerous problems, not the least of which has 
been a continuing trend of cost overruns. According to recent press reports, 
the head of the U.S. base relocation offi ce at the Ministry of National Defense, 
Maj. Gen. Park Byoung-hee, stated in August 2008 that “the sides are working 
to set the target year and to determine the exact cost of the project, but there 
still remains a difference of opinion on several issues” (Jung S. 2008i). Yonhap 
reported on 21 July 2008 that unnamed offi cials in Seoul have implied that the 
ongoing project is likely to be delayed (again) for at least a few months. This is 
another issue that will have an impact (along with the issue of a transformation 
of ROK forces that simply will not meet either the time lines or capabilities 
requirements set during the Roh administration) on the planned disestablishment 
of CFC and the corresponding establishment of two separate ROK and U.S. 
war-fi ghting commands.
IV. Wartime Operational Control: The Right Move at the Right Time?
Issues discussed earlier have direct relevance to and are also directly tied in 
with perhaps the most sensitive issue to be discussed here—the issue of wartime 
operational control. According to an agreement reached between Secretary 
of Defense Robert M. Gates and Minister of National Defense Kim Jang-soo 
in 2007, CFC is to be disestablished, and the ROK and U.S. militaries on the 
Korean peninsula will continue to function as allies with two separate wartime 
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operational commands effective 17 April 2012 (DOD 2007). Yonhap reported 
on 26 February 2007 that the issue of ROK and U.S. forces fi ghting a confl ict 
with North Korea under two separate military commands has been a huge 
source of contention; most ROK retired military offi cials and generals have 
been openly critical of the change in wartime OPCON because they believe it 
is both premature and dangerous to the security of South Korea. The Web site 
Geostrategy-Direct.com reported on 30 April 2008 that during the early months 
of 2008, U.S. offi cials reportedly said that ROK forces were making progress in 
C4I improvements that would be necessary in order to operate under separate 
wartime command beginning in 2012, but other offi cials admitted that the South 
Korean R&D budget increased only nominally compared with budgets of the 
three previous years. Indeed, tough fi nancial times ahead may mean more of 
the same in the future.
Despite the outcry from many in South Korea—particularly now that the left-
of-center government is no longer in power—several U.S. offi cials have stated 
defi nitively that postponing the date for separate war-fi ghting commands (and 
ending the successful tenure of CFC) is simply not an option. Yonhap News 
reported on 21 December 2007 that the outgoing U.S. ambassador to South 
Korea, Alexander Vershbow, stated this when he said, “As I said, the strategic 
transition plan is already agreed upon and it is being implemented.” In my 
view this is a big mistake. Although complete self-reliance and its own separate 
wartime command may seem like the right thing to do in the long run, it will quite 
simply be impossible to realistically complete all of the initiatives important for 
assuming wartime OPCON by 2012 or to have anything close to a self-reliant 
South Korean military by that time. One of the key reasons for this is because 
the threat from North Korea and the North Korean government’s intentions to 
use that threat have not subsided.
A special edition of the Korea Herald, published in December 2007 during Lee 
Myung-bak’s campaign for the presidency, reported that Lee’s aides hinted that 
Lee might consider a proposal to the United States that would push back the 
dismantlement of CFC for two or three years unless North Korea discards its 
nuclear weapons programs. Thus, the issue may not yet be dead. Kim Tae-woo, 
a researcher at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis, recently said, “Lee 
has been seeking to take a more cautious position on the wartime operational 
control transfer.” Kim further commented, “Now we must see whether Lee can 
convince the United States to change its mind, though it seems to be a long shot 
at the moment” (Jung H. 2008). Important and powerful members of the National 
Assembly also support pushing back the date for transfer of wartime OPCON. 
Not the least of these is Kim Hak-song (2008), the current chairman of the 18th 
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ROK National Assembly’s National Defense Committee; Kim opposes OPCON 
transfer before North Korean denuclearization.
Other important issues must also be considered before CFC is disestablished and 
the United States and South Korea assume separate wartime OPCON of their 
forces. The fi rst is unity of command. The loss of a unifi ed command (which 
is what exists currently) is likely to curtail the high degree of coordination that 
exists between ROK and U.S. forces today. This is also likely to lead to higher 
casualties—including among South Korean civilians. The other issue is political. 
The change in wartime OPCON could lead to misperceptions about the ability 
of the ROK military to conduct a war against the North on its own, and in the 
United States this could also lead to reduced congressional and public support 
for a large-scale presence of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula.12 This would 
be extremely dangerous for South Korea’s security and stability and would not 
bode well for regional security as a whole, particularly given the fact that some 
in the U.S. Senate have recently shown an impatience with the alliance, perhaps 
because of U.S. obligations elsewhere.
Ultimately, all of the issues addressed in this paper are tied to the issue of 
wartime OPCON. South Korea is facing tough economic times. This means the 
government is unlikely to be able to fund many of the important initiatives that 
are necessary to implement independent capabilities. These capabilities were 
not planned responsibly in the previous ROK presidential administration, which 
unwisely downplayed the North Korean threat. The same fi scal concerns facing 
ROK military acquisition programs also have an impact on Seoul’s ability to 
complete infrastructure initiatives associated with moving U.S. forces from key 
locations in the ROK to the major hub at Camp Humphreys. USFK plans to 
transform into Korea Command, as approved by the United States, beginning 
in 2010 and to begin transferring units down to Camp Humphreys as barracks 
and other facilities are built.13 If that is delayed, there will be problems. Because 
all these issues are tied together and because things simply do not seem to be 
moving on schedule, what could happen is that the United States will delay for 
a few years OPCON transfer for completion of facilities at Camp Humphreys. 
This would also give the ROK military time to build up its capabilities in a 
more realistic, pragmatic manner that would better enable it to face the threat 
from the North.
12. For additional analysis on the political and military dangers of initiating an early OPCON 
transfer, see Klingner (2008b).
13. For details about how ROK and U.S. forces will launch their separate war-fi ghting commands, 
see Jung S. (2008g).
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V. Conclusions
In my view, four basic pillars of cooperation will enhance the current status quo. 
In previous papers I have addressed the four basic pillars of cooperation, both 
domestically and with the United States, that the South Korean government can 
look to as leaders confront the threat of a rogue state to the north and the tough 
fi scal realities they will continue to face because of challenging economic times 
(Bechtol 2008):
Closer technological cooperation. This should involve bigger, more robust, 
longer-range combat, communications, and intelligence systems. Government 
and business must initiate joint ventures that will enable quality focused programs 
that will upgrade defense capabilities and surpass threat systems while they 
downplay vulnerabilities that are likely to occur as CFC is dissolved.
Closer intellectual cooperation. Intellectual cooperation should focus on 
a renewed and continuing commitment to combined doctrine, training, and 
education.
Closer ideological cooperation. Ideological cooperation includes a newfound 
commitment to democracy, human rights, and free-market economies as South 
Korea and the United States reaffi rm an alliance that faced tough times under 
the previous administration in the Blue House.
Fiscal commitment. A commitment to support the other three pillars can be 
accomplished through defense appropriations that enable realistic, threat-based 
acquisition of important systems that will be needed for truly independent 
national defense capabilities.
As South Korea looks to improve its national defense, the United States can 
also play a major role—that of a strong supporting ally. By allowing the ROK 
government time to build up its capabilities and improve its forces—perhaps by 
delaying the implementation of a change to wartime OPCON—Washington will 
prove that it supports its loyal military ally and seventh-largest trading partner 
(Business Roundtable 2006). To any analyst who has done a thorough analysis 
of current correlation of forces, opposing fi repower ratios, or terrain-dominated 
strategy, it is obvious that South Korea’s military will continue to need the help of 
the United States in meeting the North Korean threat. The tyranny of proximity 
dictates that one can hardly draw any other conclusion. Lt. Gen. Edward Rice 
of USFJ recently remarked: “North Korea continues to be a regime that is not 
very transparent in terms of their capabilities and their intentions” (AP 2008). 
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Thus, the United States and South Korea must reinforce an alliance that will 
continue to contribute to the security of the Korean peninsula and the stability 
of Northeast Asia as a whole.
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